by Erik Jones

Transatlantic Crisis? Why This Time is Different

To appreciate the radical changes that have taken place in the transatlantic relationship, it helps to have a sense of perspective.  Why is the ‘crisis’ so much more real now than it was in decades past?  You don’t need to do a lot of reading to learn that the relationship has never been easy.  Somehow, this time feels different.  To explain why, I pulled together a collection of thirteen articles I wrote about the evolution of the transatlantic relationship over the past twenty years.  One of the articles was published in Italian and so I included the English-language working paper for those who are interested.  There are three big themes in this collection – about the changing nature of power in international relations, the challenge of maintaining domestic support for engagement with the outside world, and the progressive loss of trust across the Atlantic together with the breakdown of solidarity on either side.  The articles in this collection were not written to trace these themes.  Those themes arose as I kept coming back to the same subject matter from one year, election, administration, ‘crisis’, or decade to the next.

The first essay emerged out of a special issue organized during the onset of the George W. Bush Administration’s war in Iraq.  This was a time when people focused primarily on the differences across the Atlantic and the crisis in the transatlantic partnership.  I argued that Europeans and Americans were more similar than many imagined.  They were also acutely aware of their interdependence.  The rhetoric was about crisis, but the reality was about the need for partnership.

The second essay drew out arguments about power and leadership.  Again, the emphasis was on continuity as well as change.  The global war on terror and the global economic and financial crisis created disorder, but hardly for the first time.  The late 1960s and early 1970s were similarly disruptive.  Moreover, the scholars who wrote then told us what to expect in terms of the balance of power both globally and across the Atlantic.  They also underscored the importance of collective action and hence transatlantic partnership.  This essay is particularly important because the influence that older literature has had on how I understand the way the world works.

The transatlantic partnership held together during Barack Obama’s first administration.  Europeans may not have admired Obama as much after he was elected as they did beforehand.  Obama also lost some lustre among Americans.  But he understood what was needed and he tried to deliver.  For their part, Obama’s allies in Europe were supportive.  Nevertheless, it became increasingly obvious that neither American leadership nor European support could be taken for granted.

That concern only increased toward the end of Obama’s second administration.  The problem was not the U.S. President.  It was a gradual loss of popular support for global engagement on both sides of the Atlantic.

This transformation in the transatlantic partnership was not a ‘new’ thing in the sense that it took place in response to current or recent events.  It was a progressive process that unfolded over decades.  Moreover, that process was not limited to transatlantic relations.  You could see many of the same dynamics unfolding in Europe over the previous decades.

The first Donald Trump administration undoubtedly made things worse, both across the Atlantic and within Europe.  Nevertheless, I think his rise to power was more a symptom of the dynamics at work than a cause.  Moreover, I think the damage being done was already very deep by the time Trump was elected – deep enough that it would not disappear no matter who took office.

  • ‘The US and the EU: Game Over?’ In Mario Del Pero and Paolo Magri, Eds. Four Years of Trump: The US and the World. Milan: Ledizione LediPublishing for ISPI, September 2020, pp. 161-179.

The problems were more domestic than international in nature.  Moreover, politicians on both sides of the Atlantic were well-aware of that fact.  As a result, they began to focus their economic and foreign policy instruments on the need to restore domestic legitimacy.  This change in focus increased friction across the Atlantic, but there was no better alternative.

The rest of the world could see the domestic distractions of U.S. and European politicians.  They were also eager to exploit the relative fragility of the transatlantic partnership.  Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a good illustration.  Although the Joseph R. Biden administration issued strong warnings about what was going to happen, much of Europe did not pay attention.  Ukraine’s staunch defense of its domestic sovereignty was an important wake-up call both for Europeans and for the transatlantic alliance.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to see the U.S. and European response to the full-scale invasion as a sign of rejuvenated solidarity across the Atlantic.  The transatlantic partners held together while Ukraine and the Ukrainians exceeded all expectations, and yet the durability of that relationship remained an open question for reasons that run deep both in Europe and the United States.

The transformation was not limited to security matters.  The whole economic relationship across the Atlantic and globally was changing.  Again, the primary influence was domestic and reflected the need for national politicians to shore up their own legitimacy when confronted by the electorate.  In doing so, they often rejected the constraints of participating in a global economy by trying to turn the reality of interdependence as an instrument for their own advantage.  The tension this created only increased.

Trump’s re-election as U.S. President did not create this situation any more than his first election did.  But Trump and his new administration did introduce a new element into the equation by publicly and proudly turning against so many of the foundations of transatlantic partnership and global economic leadership.  Europeans who believed they could wait out Trump after his first election no longer could afford to harbour such illusions. 

The question is whether they can reorganize Europe as an effective alternative to transatlantic partnership.  That is where we are in the debate today.  I am probably an outlier in that debate.  I believe that the European Union has no choice but to move toward some form of ‘strategic autonomy’.  As it does so, the EU will use the same technique it used in completing the internal market – which means it will rely on a collection of small decisions to add, subtract, or amend regulations to reshape the functioning of political and economic institutions.  That process will be hard to monitor as it is unfolding, because many of the small changes are easily overlooked in a time of great political turmoil.  But there is a non-linear character to these institutional adjustments that ensure small decisions have a big impact on the functioning of the European Union over time.

This collection can be made available in PDF format on request.